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Abstract 
 
 
The Cambridge Social Ontology (CSO) programme’s inability to generate a 
meaningful dialogue with mainstream economics is difficult to understand by mere 
reference to judgmental rationality and without reference to CSO’s ideological 
configuration. Our paper uses an économie des conventions framework to draw 
systematic comparisons between CSO’s ideological configuration and the ideological 
configurations of mainstream economic theories and practice. The resulting analysis 
helps us to understand not only why CSO generated little response from the 
mainstream, but also how CSO might renew its critique in ways that might be more 
likely to produce a response.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the late 1980s, defenders of what has come to be called Cambridge Social 
Ontology (CSO) have seen it as a foil for mainstream economic modelling. Tony 
Lawson (1997) constructed and elaborated a methodological critique which attempts 
to undercut the more traditional theoretical objections offered by most heterodox 
economists. Yet after nearly thirty years of prolific intellectual activity, CSO has 
received few direct responses from mainstream modellers. Instead, both critical and 
supportive voices have come almost entirely from outside the mainstream and from 
across the other social sciences.  
 
Some methodologists (Colander et al 2004; Davis 2006) have tried to explain the lack 
of response by reference to changing trends within economics. They argue that 
heterodox critics of mainstream economics in general, and Lawson in particular, 
provide outdated critiques and do not engage adequately with current trends in 
economics. More specifically, these commentators claim that what could previously 
have been described as a cohesive mainstream with a relatively limited set of 
assumptions and methods has been supplanted by a more heterogeneous group of 
cutting edge research programmes that recognise both the dynamics and complexity 
  
of economic systems and as such are sometimes (perhaps even often) 
indistinguishable from what Lawson and CSO refer to as the heterodoxy. This 
argument appears to at least partially lay responsibility for the inability to engage with 
mainstream economics at the door of proponents of CSO: they have failed to 
recognise the diversity and dynamism of current ‘mainstream’ approaches, which 
amongst other things renders their critique irrelevant since the new approaches have 
taken on ‘heterodox’ assumptions.  It is not within the remit of this article to 
specifically refute these arguments, which, in our opinion, were answered directly by 
Lawson himself in his response to Davis and elsewhere (Lawson 2009: 103-106, 
Lawson 2006: 491-495). However, it is worth noting that the research programmes 
that Davis and Colander cite as examples of cutting edge mainstream research all 
employ mathematical deductivist methods and present their analytical findings in the 
form of models (for a specific example, see Latsis & Repapis 2014). Our position, 
contra Davis and Colander, is that the limited impact of CSO arguments on the 
mainstream does not come from CSO’s failure to engage with mainstream ideas, but 
with the mainstream’s lack of interest in considering criticism levelled by proponents 
of CSO and respond in a coherent manner (though there are inevitably a small number 
of exceptions). Given the scope and ambition of the CSO critique, this relative silence 
is, prima facie, rather surprising. While claims that CSO has missed mainstream 
economics’ renewed assumptions are unconvincing, we are left with a puzzle: why is 
CSO’s critique perceived as irrelevant and devoid of value from mainstream 
economics’ perspective when it seems relevant and valuable from its own 
perspective? 
 
One way of explaining the failure of critical dialogue and debate is to invoke the 
existence of competing paradigms locked in their own language games and unable to 
address each other directly. But, in this case, a simplistic Kuhnian interpretation is not 
convincing for at least two reasons. First CSO is a philosophical and methodological 
critique, not a competing theoretical research paradigm. Second, CSO explicitly 
endorses ‘judgmental rationality’, which is the view that there are universal/isable 
ways of discriminating between theories, and it therefore rejects the Kuhnian notion 
of incommensurability.  
 
Some commentators (e.g. Lawson 2007) have already pointed out that the absence of 
critical engagement and dialogue may indicate psychological or social-psychological  
characteristics that are typically favoured within the  mainstream profession, but have 
the perverse side-effect of both narrowing the field and limiting discussions with 
outsiders. And recent sociological contributions (e.g. Fourcade et al. 2015) explain 
how the lack of engagement is facilitated by the current institutional environment. But 
these undoubtedly valuable psychological and sociological insights do not provide a 
theoretical explanation of why CSO’s critique has fallen on deaf ears. It is our 
contention that the économie des conventions (EC), with its explicit focus on situated 
judgement, the construction of legitimacy, critique and agreement can provide a 
compelling framework within which to understand CSO’s limited impact on the 
mainstream.  
 
Our argument in the remainder of this article has the following structure. First we take 
stock of CSO’s inability to engage in dialogue with, let alone affect the dominance of, 
mainstream modelling. Second, we explain the notion of judgmental rationality in the 
critical realist philosophical tradition and link it to the project of social ontology more 
  
generally and the Cambridge variant in particular. Third, we outline the core insights 
of the EC on the role of justification in the social sciences, focussing on the 
contribution of Thevenot and Boltanski in their book On Justification (2006) and on 
their important follow-up paper ‘The reality of moral expectations: a sociology of 
situated judgement’ (Boltanski & Thevenot 2000). Fourth, we use the EC framework 
to compare and contrast the different forms of judgement that are deemed to be 
legitimate within CSO and mainstream economics. The final part of our article 
discusses the broader implications of our findings for social ontology and for future 
discussions between CSO and EC and between CSO and mainstream economics 
 
1. The Dialogue of the Deaf  
 
Starting in the late 1980s, Tony Lawson’s contributions have emphasised the lack of 
fit between the methods of modern mainstream economics and the nature of social 
reality. The basis of his critique of the mainstream has been that the mathematical 
modelling methods employed by mainstream economists presuppose that the social 
world is a closed system made up of atomistic individuals. His contention is that, in 
contrast to the presuppositions of the mainstream, the social world is open and made 
up of complex, reflexive subjects and emergent structures. He draws on Roy 
Bhaskar’s philosophical writings (Bhaskar 1975/2008; 1979/2014), the history of 
economic thought (Kline 1964; Henry 1997; Gingras 2001) and on contemporary 
contributions to heterodox economics to show that an adequate economic theory can 
be constructed using different methods and relying on a different philosophical 
ontology1 – one that is consistent with his own conception of the nature of social 
reality. Lawson employs two types of arguments to bolster his case. The first is an 
immanent critique2 showing how mainstream economics fails by its own empirical 
standards of testing and prediction (see e.g. Lawson, 1997: 3-11). The repeated failure 
of economics is then used as a point of departure for an ontological discussion of the 
nature of social reality and economic systems of production and exchange (see esp. 
Lawson 2003). The second discusses the nature of social reality, and the possibility of 
its systematic study, by appealing directly to our experience of social life and the 
common sense knowledge that all appropriately socialised human beings need to 
carry out their lives (see e.g. Lawson, 1997 157-187). Together, these arguments 
provide a powerful case against the scientific status of mainstream modelling and the 
conception of social reality that it implicitly presupposes.  
 
After the publication of Economics and Reality, there was a significant critical 
response to the CSO project and to Tony Lawson’s writings in particular. Participants 
in the debate came from the philosophy of economics (e.g. Hausman 1998, Hausman 
1999, Cottrell 1998, Parsons 1999) and from heterodox economics (e.g. Hodgson 
1999, Dow 1999). Much of this early debate was reviewed and discussed in an edited 
volume by Steve Fleetwood (Fleetwood 1999). No mainstream economist engaged in 
this stage of the debate despite the fact that many of Lawson’s ideas that crystallised 
in the book had initially been published in a series of journal articles in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.   
 
                                                 
1
 We define ‘philosophical ontology’ more precisely below. 
2
 By immanent critique we mean a critique that takes the objectives of the target theory as given and 
proceeds by ‘exposing internal inconsistencies in beliefs implicit in practices, or demonstrating how 
beliefs held cannot accommodate practices actually achieved.’ (Lawson 1997: 211). 
  
In subsequent years Lawson and other members of CSO continued to publish critical 
material about mathematical modelling in economics and extended their critique to 
specific sectors of the economy (eg Fleetwood 2006, Morgan 2009) and specific 
economic techniques (e.g. Lawson 1989, Pratten 2005). There was also a concerted 
effort to construct an alternative philosophical ontology in which heterodox 
economists could anchor their different approaches (Lawson 2003, 2006). Again, 
these efforts received considerable attention in heterodox and methodology circles, as 
well as growing interest from sociology (e.g. Elder-Vass 2010) management studies 
(e.g. Al-Amoudi & Willmott 2011; Brown and Roberts 2014; Fleetwood 2005; Reed 
1997) and several other social science disciplines. Yet, once again, there was virtually 
no response from mainstream economists with the notable exception of one short 
chapter by the Nobel prize winning econometrician Clive Granger (2004) in an edited 
collection (Lewis 2004).  
 
The latter is an interesting piece because it combines sociological and substantive 
arguments in its defence of the mainstream. In the first part of the paper Granger 
points out that a critique based on the failure of modern mainstream economics faces 
the empirical counter argument that the discipline is (or was at the time), by all 
sociological measures, in rude health: journals, conferences, departments and prizes 
abound; the discipline recruits many students at post graduate level; and economists 
are often paid to advise governments and private firms. Granger also provides a more 
substantive riposte to some parts of Lawson’s argument. Yet this riposte is notable for 
both its modesty and its narrowness. Granger doesn’t claim to speak for economists, 
but merely for econometricians; he doesn’t defend high theory, but merely the use of 
specific statistical techniques and tools within econometrics. Indeed he is sometimes 
critical of econometricians, but alludes (in the same way as Davis and Colander) to 
recent developments that purportedly resolve some of the empirical worries voiced by 
Lawson and other proponents of CSO. On meta-theory he says little of note, except to 
point out that econometricians assume the existence of a ‘data generating mechanism’ 
(which he equates with CSO’s conception of social reality), and that it is ‘convenient 
to start’ with the assumption that economics is a decision science (which he then 
couches in terms of methodological individualism and rational choice). Thus, his 
philosophical assumptions are asserted without argument nor appeal to previous 
arguments, apparently without an appreciation of their fundamental importance for 
any subsequent theorisation. His intervention provides an interesting insight into the 
level at which the top of the profession is willing to engage: in short opinion pieces 
published in edited collections that make no attempt to systematically rebut the key 
arguments of the opposition camp and that partially rely on the profession’s prestige 
to answer a substantive critique of the theory.  
 
It is notable that some contributors to the methodological debate have suggested 
reasons for the lack of engagement of the mainstream. The papers in Fullbrook 
(2009), in particular, provide a number of competing explanations that are worthy of 
consideration. Parenthetically, it should be noted that these contributions do not set 
out with the objective of explaining the limited impact of CSO on the modelling 
project (as we do). Instead, they do so implicitly, as part of the critiques the authors 
provide of Lawson’s published work.  
 
The explanations fall into three broad categories. The first focuses on the meta-
theoretical nature of the CSO project. Davidsen (2009) argues that ontological 
  
critique cannot succeed so long as it remains at the level of what Lawson calls 
‘philosophical ontology’, namely the abstract conception of the social world upon 
which all economic theorising must rest in order for modelling methods to work. 
Instead, he calls for domain specific contributions that intervene directly in the 
theoretical debates of the mainstream. The idea is that economists would be 
compelled to respond if only CSO proposed new approaches and solutions to the 
problems identified by economists3. 
 
The second explanation focuses on the discourse of economics and, in particular, the 
use of mathematical language to express and investigate economic ideas. Both 
Downward and Mearman (2009) and Hodgson (2009) question Lawson’s critique of 
the mathematical method in economics, the former with respect to econometrics and 
the latter with respect to modelling more generally. The disagreements share a family 
resemblance in that all three authors argue that, despite the strength of certain 
elements of the CSO critique, its impact is limited by the fact that Lawson appears to 
wholly reject the lingua franca of modern economics: deductive modelling. Adoption 
of some part of the modelling apparatus is therefore seen as a desirable requirement 
for a dialogue between CSO and mainstream economics. 
 
The third explanation, put forward by Bernard Guerrien (2009), focuses on ideology. 
Guerrien concludes that the insistence on mainstream modelling cannot be justified 
scientifically and masks a commitment to a neoclassical ideology that supports the 
spread and development of free market systems. The reason that mainstream 
economists have failed to engage with CSO is then readily explained by the presence 
of a fundamental ideological conflict between the two parties since Lawson and other 
proponents of CSO do not share their dogmatic commitment to free markets.  
 
The first two arguments may well be relevant sociological explanations of why CSO 
has been ignored by the mainstream. Indeed, recent work by sociologists on the 
structure and functioning of the economics profession (Fourcade et al 2015) has found 
that economists are hierarchical, inward looking, extremely committed to the 
technical toolkit of the profession, and increasingly focussed on fields of empirical 
application of their models at the expense of meta-theory. However, the third 
explanation may (at least partially) hit its mark. In his response to Guerrien (Lawson 
2009) and a subsequent paper (Lawson 2012b), Lawson acknowledges the importance 
of ideology, understood as: ‘a relatively unchallenged set of (…) background ideas 
that every society or community possesses which forms the basis, or significantly 
informs, general opinion or “common sense”, a basis that remains somewhat invisible 
to most of its members, appearing as “neutral”, resting on preconceptions that are 
largely unexamined’ (Lawson 2012b: 5). Contrary to Guerrien, however, Lawson 
identifies unquestioned reliance on mathematical modelling - rather than 
                                                 
3
 It is worth noting that that Tony Lawson has contributed significantly at the level of social scientific 
ontology in recent years, developing particular accounts of the nature of the corporation (Lawson 2014; 
2015) and of money (2012a, 2016). Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that this will generate much by 
way of interaction with the mainstream even if it may lead to an enriched discussion with other 
heterodox economists with interests in these areas. 
  
unquestioned optimism about free markets - as the central ideological element 
responsible for mainstream economics’ rigidity and failure.4 
 
 Yet, while Lawson’s analysis of mainstream economics’ ideology is (in our view) 
convincing, it nonetheless begs the question of its own ideological assumptions and of 
CSO’s capacity to critically reflect, identify and surmount them. CSO’s adoption of 
the critical realist conception of judgemental rationality seems, prima facie, to provide 
a safeguard against unwarranted doctrinal assumptions, that is, against ideology of the 
sort outlined above. But does it? This is the question to which turn in the next section. 
 
 
2. Social Ontology and the Judgment Gap 
 
Since the publication of Roy Bhaskar’s pioneering early works in the philosophy of 
science (Bhaskar 1975; 1979), proponents of Critical Realism have argued that their 
contributions are founded upon three fundamental tenets often referred to as 
ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgmental rationality. 
Simplifying somewhat, these terms signal the acceptance of: 
 
1. A partly mind independent world of structured entities, including causal 
mechanisms, that underpin our experiences (ontological realism). 
2. A set of theories intended to describe those entities. All theories are socially 
produced; they are fallible and their meaningfulness is context specific 
(epistemological relativism). 
3. An ability by scientists, or some other relevant epistemic community, to agree 
which theories provide the most convincing connections between observed 
events and those mechanisms that cause them to happen (judgmental 
rationality). 
 
Despite continuing discussion of these foundational tenets (e.g. Groff 2000; Bhaskar 
1979/2014), subsequent contributions to social ontology (including CSO) have tended 
to take all three more or less for granted. And, when combined, they present an 
enticing perspective for critical-minded scholars. The commitment to ontological 
realism safeguards against the assumption -- which is often tacitly made by idealist 
and post-modernist approaches -- that social reality is entirely created by our 
conceptions of it. The commitment to epistemological relativism provides a defence 
against the charge of absolutism and scientism that dogs positivist contributions 
(especially in the social sciences). But it is the appeal to judgmental rationality that 
holds it all together. Scientific theories must, somehow, connect to underlying causal 
mechanisms and scientists must, somehow, be able to identify such connections and 
rate theories accordingly. If judgmental rationality cannot help with the task of 
adjudicating between theories, then the critical resources of social ontologists are 
stripped away and there is a risk that the position becomes a species of irrationalism. 
But abandoning judgmental rationality in the social sciences is also problematic for 
ethical reasons. Indeed, epistemological judgments relative to theories (eg. which one 
is more plausible?) are inseparable from ethical judgments relative to social forms 
(which one is more conducive to human flourishing?). Put simply, if we can agree 
                                                 
4
 This debate about the relative role of market ideology vs mathematical formalism as the touchstone of 
mainstream economics has continued with the recent  publication of two reactions to Lawson’s 2012b 
paper by Milonakis (mimeo?/ this volume?) and O’Boyle and McDonough (2017). 
  
that a certain social form impedes human flourishing, then we can also agree, ceteris 
paribus,  that this social form should be eliminated, transformed or replaced5. 
 
Bhaskar insists that scientific practice is a social process which depends on 
intersubjective agreement within a community of scientists, and that their collective 
judgment remains fallible and potentially subject to revision (see esp. Bhaskar 2008: 
185-228). He also rejects a correspondence theory of truth and states that knowledge 
of the underlying causal mechanisms is always knowledge under some particular 
theoretical description (Bhaskar 2008: 241). However, he maintains that at least some 
of the results of scientific enquiry can be ‘detached’ from theory and treated as truths 
upon which further theories can be built. In order for this to be possible, however, 
theoretical controversies must be settled on rational grounds. How these controversies 
are settled is a matter for scientists to decide, but the mere presence of intersubjective 
agreement is clearly not sufficient. In A Realist Theory of Science, Bhaskar 
emphasises the role of explanatory power as a key criterion, but does not give a 
comprehensive account of the underpinnings of rational scientific judgment: 
 
“In order to render intelligible scientific change and to reconcile it with the idea of 
scientific progress we must have the concept of an ontological realm, of objects apart 
from our descriptions of them. We can then allow, for example, that theory Ta is 
preferable to theory Tb, even if in the terminology of Kuhn and Feyerabend it is 
‘incommensurable’ with it, if theory Ta can explain under its descriptions almost all 
the phenomena p1…pn that Tb can explain under its descriptions Bp1… Bpn plus 
some significant phenomena that Tb cannot explain.” (Bhaskar 2008: 240) 
 
Writing from within the critical realist tradition, Ruth Groff (2000) has noted that 
judgmental rationality remains largely unarticulated in Bhaskar’s early philosophical 
writings and was substituted with the problematic concept of ‘alethic truth’ in his later 
writings6. She notes that: 
 
“From the beginning, there was the question of the relationship between ontological 
realism and rationality at the level of judgment. Despite Bhaskar’s early claim that 
“there is no way in which we can look at the world and then at a sentence and ask 
whether they fit” (Bhaskar 1979: 249), there has been a presumption, I would argue, 
at least among readers of Bhaskar, that accepted scientific theories do achieve such a 
fit—and that accountability to the idea of such a fit is precisely what is meant by the 
notion of rationality at the level of judgment. Moreover, there has been a tendency to 
regard the principle of ontological realism as providing an anchor for, and as thereby 
authorizing, judgmental rationality so construed. According to this line of reasoning, 
it is possible to discriminate between competing theories on rational grounds exactly 
because there is a real, intransitive domain, the causal structure of which may be more 
or less accurately identified by competing causal accounts.” (Groff 2000: 418) 
                                                 
5
 Although Bhaskar claims that he dedicated his third book Scientific Realism and Human 
Emancipation to the third tenet of critical realism (judgmental rationality), this is not exactly what we 
have found on the several occasions when we have read it. The book offers first and foremost an 
extremely sophisticated, and exploratory, critique of positivism under its various guises. While the 
chapter on 'critical naturalism and the dialectic of human emancipation' features important arguments 
on the link between facts and values, there is very little on the social processes through which agents 
engage in judgementally rational discussion 
6
 The first point at least is acknowledged by Bhaskar in a more recent contribution (Bhaskar 2007). 
  
 
More specifically, Groff’s contribution points to a ‘judgment gap’ that, we believe, 
persists today in the literature on social ontology: if one takes the notion of 
epistemological relativism seriously, then the challenge is to elaborate a more 
comprehensive account of how certain intersubjective agreements come to be justified 
as scientifically legitimate whilst others do not. 
 
How does this apply to CSO more specifically? As we saw above, Lawson’s critique 
is grounded in ontology – more specifically the mismatch between philosophical 
ontology and mainstream economic theory – but he also recognises that theories are 
human constructions that are separate from the underlying mechanisms and processes 
that they aim to describe. Early on, he subscribed explicitly to Bhaskar’s three tenets, 
using the critical realist concepts of the transitive and intransitive domains: 
  
“If knowledge is not merely given in experience, it is hardly intelligible that it is 
created out of nothing. It must, then, come about through a transformation of pre-
existing knowledge-like materials. In other words, it is necessary … to recognise a 
transitive dimension to knowledge, or epistemology to complement the intransitive 
dimension to knowledge, or ontology, already established. That is, it is necessary to 
recognise a dimension of transitive objects of knowledge, including facts, 
observations, theories, hypotheses, guesses, hunches, intuitions, speculations, 
anomalies, etc., which condition all further knowledge, and in particular facilitate, and 
come to be actively transformed through, the laborious social practice of science. In 
short, knowledge must be recognised as a produced means of production (of further 
knowledge) and science as an ongoing transformative social activity.” (Lawson 1997: 
25) 
 
But Lawson’s focus (unlike Bhaskar’s) is economics and the contested nature of the 
field means that defining progress and justifying theory choice are never far from the 
forefront of his mind. Thus he provides a more elaborate account of explanatory 
power than the sketch provided by Bhaskar: the theory of contrastive explanation. 
This position has been developed at length subsequently, so we will only provide a 
brief description here. The essence of the argument is that knowledge of the social 
world is derived from the identification of rough empirical patterns termed ‘demi-
regs’. Demi-regs are imperfect associations between two or more measured variables 
that may hint at the operation of an underlying causal mechanism. When our 
expectations of such patterns within a specified ‘contrast space’ are flouted, for 
instance because two patterns that we expect to be similar (crop yields in 
neighbouring fields) turn out to be different, then this can provide insight into the 
operation of the underlying mechanism. In the social sciences in particular, insights 
can be of two basic sorts: 
 
“The basis of our surprise may indeed be a new causal factor coming into play, but 
equally it may merely be that our prior assessment of the nature of the contrast space 
was significantly in error all along. From such considerations we can see that the 
possibility of a progressive transformation in our knowledge does not require that we 
have judged the contrast space correctly, merely that we had rational grounds for the 
judgment formed” (Lawson 2003: 91, my italics) 
 
  
Despite his valuable elaboration of the concept of explanatory power applied to the 
social sciences, Lawson’s position effectively inherits the questions raised about 
Bhaskar’s judgment gap. The progress of social science is fundamentally dependent 
on judgmental rationality, which is responsible for setting the limits of the contrast 
space, for forming expectations based on anterior knowledge, for qualifying observed 
situations as ‘surprises’ or contradictions to expectations, and for prompting a need 
for revision of existing theory and further theoretical elaboration. We can see, even in 
the simple case of identifying mechanisms behind unequal crop growth in a given 
field, that there is no ready-made or rationally deducible formula for setting a contrast 
space and deriving conclusions from it. The presence of a river, or parasitic animals 
or shaded areas all seem prima facie equally plausible candidates that are neither 
exclusive nor exhaustive.  Yet, to avoid irrationalism, Lawson requires the setting of 
the contrast space, and the conclusions drawn from it, to be established on some 
grounds other than context specific intersubjective agreement. It is not legitimate for 
two scientists to decide to attribute unequal crop growth to parasites on the sole basis 
that doing so would please a friend owning a pest-control company. In other words, a 
properly scientific approach does not only attempt to establish agreement among 
present participants, but it should also seek to secure agreement from putative 
participants as well. Indeed, Lawson’s critique of mainstream economics would suffer 
significantly if this were not the case as it would be objected that he is attempting to 
replace the mainstream economics project with an incoherent programme that can 
only envisage local agreements and that is not conducive to growing or refining 
knowledge over time.  
 
This leaves CSO in a similar position to the CR-inspired philosophical research that 
preceded it. Since judgmental rationality cannot simply be read off from ontological 
realism, proponents cannot ignore the problem of how justification is constructed in 
the social sciences. The CSO critique of mainstream economics exacerbates this need 
because there is widespread intersubjective agreement amongst mainstream 
economists that their methods are appropriate and their core theoretical and empirical 
findings are reliable. A judgmental relativist would be forced to either accept this 
position, or cast his or her critique purely in terms of competing ideologies, something 
that Lawson has repeatedly resisted doing (see our argument in Part 1). Needless to 
say, we do not consider this to be a fatal flaw in the CSO project, but it does indicate 
an important area for theoretical development. We do not believe that proponents of 
CSO are engaged in an internal debate which relies on purely local / intersubjective 
justificatory mechanisms (indeed their explicit rejection of postmodernism is strong 
evidence of this position). Out of instinct and common sense, most of their studies 
seek to secure some form of potentially universalisable justifiability: they are intended 
to convince their interlocutors through some combination of logical argument, 
demonstrations of explanatory power, and empirical evidence. And yet this 
universalisable justifiability fails to convince mainstream economists. It remains 
unclear therefore what the conditions of possibility of this universalisable justifiability 
are. What are its limits? On what grounds is it criticisable by mainstream economics? 
And how might such a critique ultimately be deemed legitimate?    
 
One difficulty facing CSO, like any other research programme, is that, by definition, 
its ideological assumptions are opaque to it. Fortunately, ideological opacity does not 
imply impenetrability and can be surmounted to some extent. Our current project is 
relatively modest as we endeavour to clarify some, rather than all, the assumptions of 
  
CSO. Yet, even such a pared-down endeavour is not trivial. How can a given project 
clarify at least some of its own unseen assumptions?  
 
Our chosen approach consists in pursuing our analysis from a different, yet largely 
congruent, interpretative framework. This shift allows us to objectify CSO and step 
back from its (non-) debate with mainstream economics. Our intention in the rest of 
the paper is therefore to treat CSO as an object of analysis rather than as an analytical 
resource. Metaphorically, we are trying to see our own eyes but need a mirror to do 
so. The économie des conventions, or French convention school, initially developed 
in the late 1980s by Luc Boltanski, François Eymard-Duvernay, Jean-Pierre Dupuy, 
Olivier Favereau, Robert Salais and Laurent Thevenot and now pursued by thousands 
of researchers around the world provides one such mirror. 
 
 
3. The EC on Justification: a primer 
 
Like Bhaskar, Boltanski and Thevenot (2006) start with the idea of judgment, though 
unlike Bhaskar their concern is not so much with the rational judgment of scientists, 
but more with the general conditions under which judgments made by social agents 
are or can be made legitimate. While the primary concern of Bhaskar and Lawson is 
with how knowledge can be justified and truth be (tentatively) established, Boltanski 
and Thevenot are principally interested in how social objects and configurations can 
be justified, and how legitimacy is established. They introduce their meta-theoretical 
framework  with a lively example: 
 
‘Let us consider, for example, a dispute between two drivers after a collision. 
The furious indignation of the first can stem from a series of heterogeneous 
vexations he suffered the same day: his wife fell ill; his son had very bad 
grades at school; his boss humiliated him; he is anxious about a pain in his 
throat (maybe cancer) and, in addition to that, this stupid guy bumps into his 
new, beautiful car. That’s too much! But the second driver can also have a 
series of personal reasons to complain against a nasty world: his mother just 
died the day before; his taxes have increased; his last book has been refused 
by the publisher and, moreover, there is this idiot, in the middle of the road. 
That’s too much! If they want to escape violence they must be able to 
eliminate most of these motives of discontent as ‘private’ and to converge 
towards a common definition of the relevant objects in the situations – such as 
highway codes, states of tires, etc. But in order to converge in sorting out 
relevant and irrelevant items they must share a common capacity to see what 
fits the situation and under which relation. They need, hence, a common 
definition of the form of generality which allows to connect this situation with 
other ones identified as similar.’ (Boltanski and Thevenot, 1999: 361). 
 
   
There is certainly quite a bit to unpack in the above example and the last sentence, in 
particular, deserves additional explanation for readers unfamiliar with the économie 
des conventions. What do the authors mean by a ‘form of generality’? And why does 
justification necessitate that ‘the specific situation be connected with other ones 
identified as similar’? 
 
  
Just as critical realism defends the principle that there are multiple ways of referring 
to a state of affairs (epistemological relativism), the économie des conventions 
supposes that there are multiple ways of describing and justifying a state of affairs. It 
does not follow that anything goes, but rather that, to be generalizable and 
understandable by other social agents, descriptions, justifications, valuations and 
critiques must follow a certain grammar. They must be expressed and assembled in 
certain ways that make them recognisable by other agents who are capable of using 
the same grammar. Some elements of this grammar are culturally and historically 
specific while others are universal across human societies (more on this below). 
  
Whilst Boltanski and Thevenot do not use the idea of judgmental rationality 
explicitly, we believe it is nonetheless at the heart of their model of situated 
judgement. Indeed, they explicitly reject an irrationalist stance and argue instead that 
‘arguments have to be solid enough to be able to resist questions of an indeterminate 
number of new, not yet specified, partners’ (Boltanski and Thevenot 2000: 214). Of 
central importance for our purposes, their framework provides a conceptual prism 
through which it is possible to compare and contrast CSO’s judgemental rationality 
with the competing conception of judgment implicit in mainstream economic 
approaches. But let us illustrate the économie des conventions’ basic features on the 
simpler example of the car accident mentioned above before mobilising it in the next 
section to compare the more complex and contested ideological configurations of 
CSO, mainstream economics theory and mainstream economics practice. 
  
Boltanski and Thevenot analyse ideological configurations, aka polities or worlds of 
worth, by systematically studying how agents engage in justification and critique. To 
do so, they identify common higher principles through which agents extract 
themselves from their immediate situation and rise to a higher level of generality. For 
instance, while profitability constitutes the higher principle of the market world, it is 
second to efficiency in the world of production and to the collective will in the civic 
world. Thus, the same object, say a car accident will be valued according to its 
monetary cost in the market world (how much?), to the traffic inefficiencies generated 
in the industrial world (how many hours lost for how many drivers?) and to the 
respect of driving codes in the civic world (which rules have been broken by whom?)  
 
Judgments of worth operate by bringing together persons and objects into 
homogeneous, recognisable, categories. This operation is designated by Boltanski and 
Thevenot as the qualification of persons and objects. Thus, whether a given object, 
say again a road accident, is qualified as a monetary loss or as a traffic perturbation or 
as an infringement to the law will determine in which world of worth its value will be 
justified. And conversely, justifying an accident’s worth only in terms of its market 
value presupposes that we are dismissing other worlds of worth. Think, for example 
of a careless driver stopping after the collision and handing an envelope filled with 
bank notes while uttering: ‘this should cover your costs, let’s never talk about this 
again’.  
 
To be legitimate, a polity must endow all participants with common humanity, that is, 
with equal capacity in principle to participate in social life by qualifying situations, 
issuing judgments of worth, issuing critiques and putting judgments to the test. With 
the exception of utopian homogeneous communities, the principle of common 
humanity coexists in tension with the fact that agents have differential access in 
  
practice to what they are all equally entitled to in principle. Thus, while every human 
being may in principle be able to determine who is at fault in a complex car accident 
(and thus act as a magistrate or judge), some individuals are deemed to be better 
qualified than others to exercise such judgments. 
 
In a legitimate polity, the worth of a person or an object is regularly subjected to 
reappraisal through tests of worth. Thus a driver’s worth will be confirmed or 
questioned depending on how she handles dangerous traffic situations unfolding 
while the tests of worth for a car will depend on the world of worth within which it is 
inscribed. A car’s worth may be tested at the time of selling it (market world), when it 
is driven at speed on a rainy motorway (industrial world) or when it passes anti-
pollution controls (civic world).  
 
The coexistence of different polities encompassing different principles and tests of 
worth is naturally subject to conflict. Indeed, critique occupies a central place in 
Boltanski and Thevenot’s model, and a substantial portion of their work retraces the 
various ways in which each polity can be mobilised to criticise a specific social 
configuration. Thus the driver responsible for the road accident can be criticised for 
having broken a rule (civic world), for having lost control of his/her car (industrial 
world) or for having generated a monetary loss (market world). But ideological 
configurations, as much as the social objects which are inscribed in them, can be the 
target of critique. As an illustration, critiques from the civic world can be mobilised 
towards the market world (deemed to be unfair because it privileges haves over have 
nots) and towards the industrial world (deemed to privilege performance at the 
expense of respect for due procedure).  
 
The preceding summary of Boltanski and Thevenot’s model provides us with the 
basic lens through which we may now examine the modes of justification employed 
by CSO in contradistinction with those employed by mainstream economics. 
 
 
4. Justification in CSO and Mainstream Economics: an EC perspective 
 
We now mobilise Boltanski and Thevenot’s approach to make sense of the dialogue 
of the deaf between CSO and mainstream economics. One difficulty is that the 
practices and the theories of mainstream economists are frequently, and normally, out 
of touch (see Dequech 2017 for a recent discussion). Leamer (1978) famously argued 
that the practice and theory of mainstream economics are largely disconnected. As he 
put it: 
 
‘The opinion that econometric theory is largely irrelevant is held by an 
embarrassingly large share of the economics profession. … We 
comfortably divide ourselves into a celibate priesthood of statistical 
theorists, on the one hand, and a legion of inveterate sinner-data 
analysts, on the other. … I began thinking about these problems when I 
was a graduate student in economics at the University of Michigan, 
1966-1970. At that time there was a very active group building an 
econometric model of the United States. As it happens, the 
econometric modelling was done in the basement of the building and 
the econometric theory courses were taught on the top floor (the third). 
  
I was perplexed by the fact that the same language was used in both 
places. Even more amazing was the transmogrification of particular 
individuals who wantonly sinned in the basement and metamorphosed 
into the highest of high priests as they ascended to the third floor.’ 
(Leamer 1978: vi) 
 
The near schizophrenic situation described by Leamer encourages us to distinguish, in 
our analysis, between the ideological configuration of mainstream economics theory 
and the ideological configuration of mainstream economics practice. A careful reader 
might also query on what basis can we assume an equivalence between 
‘econometrics’, ‘mainstream economics’ and ‘mainstream modelling’. This 
equivalence is justified in light of the arguments developed by Lawson (2006: 491-
495), Cf. section 1 above. 
 
The EC model outlined above (section 3) provides us with an analytical lens that 
allows us to observe CSO and mainstream economics theory and practice as 
ideological configurations. More specifically, the EC model invites us to 
systematically flesh out, compare and contrast otherwise taken for granted 
assumptions regarding each ideological formation’s common higher principle; 
qualification of persons and objects; principles of common humanity and legitimate 
tests of worth. 
 
4.1. Common higher principles 
Researchers operating from within each of these ideological configurations must 
espouse a common higher principle in order to attain a level of generality that allows 
them to transcend purely subjective judgments. Differences in these principles are 
expressed explicitly in the case of CSO and mainstream economics. As we saw in the 
discussion of the CSO’s contrastive method, the proximate objective of theorising is 
to explain the range of causal mechanisms underlying observable patterns in events. 
And this common higher principle is anchored in at least two further values: an 
epistemic commitment to truth and a normative commitment to emancipation, both 
inherited from critical realism. In contrast, since Friedman’s (1953) intervention, the 
proximate objective of mainstream theorising has been predictive success. Again, this 
common higher principle masks a deeply held epistemic commitment to mathematical 
rigour, and a normative commitment to technocratic utility and policy relevance. 
However, mainstream economic practice has notably failed to produce accurate 
predictions of future states of affairs and even trend prediction seems to be beyond the 
grasp of most mainstream modellers. This has led mainstream economists to retreat to 
a different proximate goal in practice: disciplinary prestige. To produce ‘good 
economics’ has become a very complex and difficult task that is highly prized within 
the academy and (at least until recently) outside it. The underlying epistemic 
commitment to mathematical rigour remains, but it is underpinned by a different (in 
this case aesthetic) commitment to the elegance and simplicity of models rather than 
the production of accurate predictions. 
 
4.2. Qualification of persons and objects 
The process of ‘qualification’ is also radically different across polities. The CSO 
approach presupposes that social entities are concept-dependent and thus recognizes 
that social science (including economics) are characterized by ‘an inescapable 
hermeneutic moment, one that (…) may be of greater consequences than any similar 
  
or comparable moment in natural science.’ (Lawson 1997: 35). Participants’ reasons 
should not only be interpreted, but their causes and effects should also be explained in 
terms of causal mechanisms discovered via the investigation of surprising contrasts. 
On the other hand, mainstream economics in theory focusses on the quantifiable data 
of observed reality, and, in practice, is heavily constrained by the technical toolkit that 
dominates the profession (though its content may change over time). And these 
differences have significant consequences for the ways in which judgments are put to 
test and justifications are produced. Whilst the contrastive method suggests that 
prediction will be difficult to attain outside controlled settings and focusses on the 
discovery of hitherto unidentified causal mechanisms, mainstream economists 
maintain that accurate predictions are possible and advocate rigorous econometric 
testing. Failure to predict economic events has led, however, to the development of 
other tests in practice. Rather than accurate forecasts, quality is established via a self-
referential process involving the laborious scrutiny of models in the peer review 
process of leading journals. If publication in one of a very small number of such 
prestigious journals is secured, the value of the publication becomes a tradeable 
commodity that is not necessarily connected to the content of the article. In many 
cases such publications will secure career advancement for the author.  
 
It is worth noting that CSO researchers are subject to similar social constraints as long 
as they attempt to maintain a position in an academic economics department. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that CSO researchers who had obtained top marks in 
mathematical degrees from top universities had either to accept teaching-focused 
positions or had to pursue their careers in departments less obsessed with mainstream 
economics’ modes of qualification. These survival routes include universities outside 
the English speaking world and business schools. 
 
4.3 Principles of common humanity 
The principles of common humanity that underpin each approach are also at odds. 
The CSO follows the social sciences in positing reflexive human subjects, partially 
constituted by the relations that they have with each other. Human reflexivity extends 
beyond lay people’s ability to interpret social situations and also encompasses their 
ability to understand the conclusions of economists/social scientists and orient their 
activities accordingly. This ‘double hermeneutic’ (a term coined by Giddens 1984 but 
re-employed by Lawson 1997: 197; 2009: 279-80) establishes a symmetry, in terms of 
human dignity, between laymen and economists. 
 
In contrast, mainstream economists focus on the economic agent as an isolated atom. 
Mainstream economic theorists arrived at a well-defined conception of the economic 
agent as a rational optimiser (whether individual or collective) which guarantees a 
common humanity of economic subjects across models but which falls short of 
maintaining a symmetry between the researcher and the researched. In practice this 
conception of rational atomistic agents has become increasingly flexible in order to 
accommodate new theoretical ideas emanating from within the discipline, but the 
reflexive and relational features of human subjects have continued to be ignored since 
they cannot be incorporated into the standard technical toolkit. While an 
impoverished yet common humanity of agents is still maintainable in the specific 
context of each model, the multiplication of models has generated a corresponding 
multiplication of conceptions of humanity. Moreover, the interpretation of 
mathematical rigour as modelling prowess has encouraged the introduction of unreal, 
  
and ultimately inhuman, characteristics beyond atomicity and rational optimization 
(for a defence of unrealistic assumptions, see Kanazawa 1998). These include, 
depending on models, infinitely lived individuals, agents capable of accessing and 
processing complete information, or endowed with perfect memories, and so on. 
 
4.4 Tests of worth 
Partly because of the above differences, CSO and mainstream economics rely on very 
different ways of testing the legitimacy of their own judgements. While CSO 
recognizes the fallibility and relativity of knowledge claims, it also defends a 
conception of judgmental rationality that posits that products of academic activity can 
and should be judged on the basis of their relative power to explaining surprising 
states of affairs. We have examined in section 2 (above) some of the internal 
limitations of tests of legitimacy based on CSO’s ontological and epistemological 
premises as CSO determines some aspects of the dynamics of justification while 
leaving others open to discussion between participants. 
 
Yet, the internal limitations of CSO’s judgmental rationality and associated tests do 
not allow us, on their own, to understand the dialogue of the deaf with mainstream 
economics. This deafness can only be understood if we also appreciate how further 
apart mainstream economics’ tests of legitimacy are from CSO’s. Indeed, mainstream 
theorists evaluate the legitimacy of economic theories with regards to their predictive 
power. One consequence is that they have little patience for explanatory projects. The 
only version of explanation they are ready to accept as legitimate must conform to 
something like Hempel’s deductive-nomological model. That is, a version of 
‘explanation’ that corresponds to a specific case of past-oriented prediction (for a 
defence of this approach to explanation, see Hempel 1965).  
 
Another, equally important consequence of valuing predictive power, is that tests of 
worth based on predictive success have failed repeatedly over the past 50 years or so. 
No sooner a prediction seems confirmed that new data disconfirms it (Lawson 1997, 
ch. 7). The response of mainstream modellers is, however, telling. Rather than 
discrediting their own ideological configuration, they seem to have protected it by 
having recourse to a less damning test consisting in showcasing mathematical 
prowess. Hence, Friedman’s observation that ‘economics has become increasingly an 
arcane branch of mathematics rather than dealing with real economic problems.’ 
(Friedman, 1999: 137, cited in Lawson 2006: 490), 
 
While mainstream economic theory views CSO explanations as partial and imperfect 
approximations of a properly scientific explanation (as past-oriented reversed 
prediction), the gap is even wider when we consider the tests of legitimacy employed 
by practitioners, rather than theorists, of mainstream economics. The slip from tests of 
worth based on prediction to tests of worth based on mathematical prowess are, of 
course, at the heart of the efforts, hopes and fears of practicing economists. But on 
these theoretical tests are intertwined with other, more institutional, tests employed 
when valuing the worth of an economist. The latter include securing promotion 
through publication in prestigious journals and by securing influence outside 
academia, for instance by obtaining roles in private or national banks, in political 
think tanks, and so on. And conversely, authors who have not succeeded through 
these rites of passage are considered either as failed economists or as researchers in a 
different field of the social sciences.  
  
 
5. Discussion: cracks in the mainstream citadel 
 
Through these contrasts we can see how CSO, mainstream theory and mainstream 
practice constitute quite different ideological configurations. The gulf between the 
mainstream and CSO is not merely explainable by reference to different languages 
and different theoretical assumptions about the nature of their objects of study. If that 
were the case, then some of these gaps might have been bridged during the last thirty 
years. Rather, the ongoing dialogue of the deaf is the by-product of the adoption of 
completely different normative frameworks of justification. And, since these 
frameworks anchor judgments within each polity, conflict between polities cannot be 
settled by using them. While our assessment of mathematical modelling’s hegemony 
is largely congruent with Lawson (2006, 2012b), our EC analysis also highlights 
aspects which are arguably downplayed by Lawson and indicate potential weaknesses 
in the mainstream hegemony. 
 
The first weakness is that the practices of mainstream economics are, from an EC 
perspective, open to contestation on the grounds of their violation of the principle of 
common humanity. Indeed, mainstream economists presuppose differences between 
scientists and laypersons that can be interpreted, from a perspective that values equal 
human dignity, as an arrogant stance held by ‘experts’ in the face of ‘common 
people’. It is noteworthy that the discussions preceding the United Kingdom’s recent 
referendum on exiting the European Union highlighted defiance of the British 
population at large towards ‘experts’ in general and towards economists in particular. 
Perhaps approaches influenced by CSO and based on observation, discussion with 
economic agents and on the formulation of fallible hypotheses - rather than on 
obscure and failing mathematical models - could win again the hearts of the general 
public including university students? (see Favereau 2015 for an insightful account of 
orthodox economists’ arrogance towards heterodox colleagues). 
 
The second weakness is that, while CSO’s critique of mainstream economics has 
developed by examining the latter’s ontological assumptions, another, perhaps more 
effective critique, might focus on the tests of legitimacy employed by mainstream 
economics. And critiques addressing the fact that theorists have failed to predict over 
sustained periods of time or that they have been more concerned with departmental 
politics than with the quest for truth are perhaps likely to gather more traction than 
critiques of questionable ontological presuppositions. Indeed, our succinct économie 
des conventions analysis invites us and our readers to contemplate future research on 
the organisation of tests of legitimacy within those organisations employing 
economists. Thus, rather than seeking a grand narrative in terms of the domination of 
mathematical modelling in Western Society, as Lawson does quite successfully, our 
paper invites researchers to retrace the various struggles through which mainstream 
economics’ tests of legitimacy have grown in importance in universities and other 
academic institutions. Such studies could, at their most basic level, consist of a 
longitudinal comparison of exam scripts in reputable departments of economics. The 
apparition, and then dominance, of mathematical exercises could be valuably put in 
perspective by documentary analysis of minutes, memoirs of scholars and, perhaps, 
interviews of emeriti who lived long enough to still remember earlier practices. More 
complex studies might also establish links between the transformation of tests of 
  
worth with the spread of neo-liberal think tanks in the McCarthyite USA and anti-
communist Britain (see the works of Djelic on the creation of Atlas, esp. Djelic 2014).  
 
We believe that attending to these, sometimes downplayed or forgotten struggles, 
might shed light on now defunct but eventually or partly resurrectable, tests of 
legitimacy for the community of academics interested in the study of economic 
phenomena (see Al-Amoudi and Latsis 2015 for a social theoretical account of 
institutional death and the significance of forgotten struggles).    
 
Conclusion 
 
The EC framework allows us to go further than merely noting the absence of dialogue 
between CSO and mainstream economics. It offers us a prism through which CSO 
can be compared and contrasted with the theory and practice of mainstream 
economics. Our EC prism allows us to avoid ad hominem considerations and to 
identify fundamental differences impeding dialogue between the two approaches to 
the study of economic phenomena. We have illustrated how the two programmes 
differed in terms of their higher common principles, the way they qualify persons and 
objects, the demands they put on common humanity and the trials through which 
claims to validity are tested and judged.  
 
By adopting an EC grid of analysis, we could provide a systematic examination of the 
basic disputes between CSO and the theory and practice of mainstream economics. 
Although we acknowledge our sympathy for the CSO programme, it is also our belief 
that the EC framework facilitated a comparison that is more impartial than if it had 
been formulated from within a single programme. 
 
In this respect, the greatest advantage of the EC framework is that it has helped us to 
step back and delineate some of the limits of the judgmental rationality that is at the 
heart of the CSO approach. Indeed, CSO takes for granted higher common principles 
based on truth and human emancipation. By doing so, it fails to convince interlocutors 
who would regard truth and emancipation in high esteem but would nonetheless 
privilege further another (set of) values. While we have no doubt that mainstream 
economists hold some regard for truth and human emancipation, our analysis 
indicates that mainstream theorists hold predictive accuracy in even greater esteem 
while practitioners of economics seem particularly enthused by mathematical 
elegance and securing influence over decision –making. But these differences concern 
neither the nature of the world, nor the nature of knowledge, but rather the nature of 
the values at the heart of the economic sciences, and the structure of those tests 
through which academic worth is evaluated. Behind the grand narrative of the 
hegemony of science as mathematics (Lawson 2012b), our approach attracts attention 
to small scale struggles through which current tests of legitimacy came to be 
established. Our analysis also invites us to observe and imagine struggle tactics that 
may invalidate or replace them. And behind the ontological and epistemological 
dispute opposing CSO to mainstream economics, our study also indicates the 
existence of an equally important axiological dispute. 
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